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I. INTRODUCTION
Nicholas Schmidt Bryce Stephens
As artificial intelligence (AI)
and machine learning (ML) have
become more common in our daily
lives, one of the most pressing is-
sues in its adoption has been the
difficulty in ensuring fairness and
transparency in their use. There is
substantial evidence that AI and
ML algorithms can cause bias
against minorities, women, and
other protected classes. Facial recognition programs are more likely to mis-
identify people with darker skin; an employment test sometimes gives
lower scores to women who graduated from women’s colleges or who
participated in women’s sports; people of color may be less likely to receive
certain marketing offers (including housing) because of social media be-
havior or geography; and minority groups have been shown to be falsely
flagged as being more likely to be recidivists than whites.1
1. Jeffrey Dastin, Amazon Scraps Secret AI Recruiting Tool that Showed Bias Against
Women, Reuters (Oct. 8, 2018), https://reut.rs/2Po4ZJi [https://perma.cc/
K9GT-HBHR]; Julie Angwin & Jeff Larson, Bias in Criminal Risk Scores is Math-
ematically Inevitable, Researchers Say, ProPublica (Dec. 30, 2016), https://bit.ly/
2iTc4B9 [https://perma.cc/PEL9-ZTHP]; Jeff Larson et al., How We Analyzed the
COMPAS Recidivism Algorithm, ProPublica (May 23, 2016), https://bit.ly/
1TGK42v [https://perma.cc/D3QJ-4M84]; Steve Lohr, Facial Recognition is Ac-
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The increasing use of AI and ML techniques in employment, consumer
finance, and housing has caught the attention of the federal regulatory
community, the executive branch, and Congress. There is growing interest
in these technological innovations—as well as the use of so-called alter-
native data—and the risks and benefits they pose. The White House, Con-
sumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), Federal Reserve Board, Federal
Trade Commission, and the Government Accountability Office have all re-
leased reports or posted requests for information on topics related to al-
gorithmic fairness; the use of AI and ML in employment, credit, and hous-
ing markets; and the use of alternative data.2 Recently, Senators Booker,
Wyden, and Clark introduced the Algorithmic Accountability Act, “which
requires companies to study and fix flawed computer algorithms that result
in inaccurate, unfair, biased or discriminatory decisions impacting Amer-
icans.”3
Government interest has been focused on the potential benefits and risks
of the use of AI, ML, and alternative data to consumers, employees, and
markets. In credit markets, for example, there is hope that reliance on non-
traditional credit data may lead to an expansion in access to credit for
consumers who are currently not in the traditional credit system.Moreover,
ML and AI techniques can be applied to large-scale datasets (e.g., big data)4
and are better at predicting outcomes than traditional statistical techniques.
Better model predictions lead to more efficient allocations in credit, labor,
and housing markets.
The risks associated with AI, ML, and alternative data are most apparent
when considering the contexts in which models and data are developed
and used. While the use of AI opens new avenues of risk for consumers
where additional legislation may be required (especially relating to pri-
curate, if You’re a White Guy, N.Y. Times (Feb. 9, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2H3QeaT
[https://perma.cc/J86U-89MQ].
2. U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO–19–111, Financial Technology:
Agencies Should Provide Clarification on Lenders’ Use of Alternative
Data (2018), https://bit.ly/2NBFBjm [https://perma.cc/VHE2-ML8Q]; Re-
quest for Information Regarding Use of Alternative Data and Modeling Tech-
niques in the Credit Process, 82 Fed. Reg. 11183 (Feb. 21, 2017); Exec. Office
of the President, Big Data: A Report on Algorithmic Systems, Oppor-
tunity, and Civil Rights (2016), https://bit.ly/2lCSs8H [https://perma.cc/
ZL8V-2PKF]; Fed. Trade Comm’n, Big Data: A Tool for Inclusion or Ex-
clusion? Understanding the Issues (2016), https://bit.ly/1n52gG6 [https://
perma.cc/MW9H-VWGQ]; Carol A. Evans, Keeping Fintech Fair: Thinking About
Fair Lending and UDAP Risks, Consumer Compliance Outlook (2017),
https://bit.ly/2HaqfR1 [https://perma.cc/8UJN-X7GY].
3. Press Release, Cory Booker for U.S. Senator for N.J., Booker, Wyden, Clarke
Introduce Bill Requiring Companies to Target Bias in Corporate Algorithms
(Apr. 10, 2019), https://www.booker.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=903
[https://perma.cc/N29T-9SQM].
4. See discussion infra Section III.
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vacy), there are already a number of federal and many state-level laws
addressing discrimination and unfairness that can be applied to the out-
comes driven by these technologies. Specifically, federal laws have been
enacted to protect consumers from discrimination in credit, housing, and
employment, where federal regulators and agencies are tasked with en-
forcing these laws.5 Additionally, there are laws in place to ensure that
consumers understand why they are denied access to credit and to ensure
the right for consumers to correct errors in their credit reports.6 There are
also federal and state laws that protect consumers from unfair and decep-
tive practices.7
Despite the laws and regulations that are already in place, the advent
of AI, ML, and alternative data in automated decision-making poses
unique challenges for regulators, lenders, and firms when evaluating mod-
els for compliance and potential violations of consumer protection laws.
Models that are built using ML or more advanced AI techniques often
exhibit a black box quality, meaning that the relationships between model
inputs and model predictions may not be straightforward or easy to de-
scribe. This makes explaining model outcomes a challenging, though no
longer intractable, problem. Developing approaches to minimize discrim-
inatory impact is also more challenging with ML and AI methods. Finally,
reliance on alternative data raises many questions around considerations
of compliance and policy. For instance, if a consumer’s educational attain-
ment is predictive of credit default, but also highly correlated with race,
can it be used in a credit model without running afoul of the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act’s (ECOA) anti-discrimination provisions? If so, would re-
lying on educational attainment data perpetuate, or worse, amplify his-
torical inequities in access to credit?8
5. Federal anti-discrimination laws include: the Equal Credit Opportunity Act
(ECOA) (consumer credit), the Fair Housing Act, and Title VII (employment).
15 U.S.C. § 1691 (2017); 42 U.S.C. § 3604; id. § 2000(e).
6. The Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) governs how consumer credit infor-
mation is collected, maintained, and used. 15 U.S.C. § 1681. Both the FCRA and
the ECOA require that a consumer be made aware of the principal reasons for
a denied request for credit. Id. §§ 1681, 1691.
7. There are two federal statutes: Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices and
Unfair, Deceptive, or Abusive Acts and Practices. Id. § 45; 12 U.S.C. § 5531. Most
states and United States territories have adopted statutes mirroring these fed-
eral statues.
8. The example raised is not hypothetical. In 2017, Upstart, Inc. applied for and
received a no action letter from the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau in-
dicating that the Bureau would take no supervisory or enforcement action with
respect to potential violations of the ECOA for Upstart’s use of education and
employment information in its credit underwriting model. Press Release, Con-
sumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, CFPB Announces First No-Action Letter to Upstart
Network: Company to Regularly Report Lending and Compliance Informa-
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II. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND MACHINE LEARNING
The concept of artificial intelligence emerged from the field of computer
science in the 1950s and broadly refers to machine-based operations that
mimic human intelligence. One of the first ideas around the concept of AI
was that a computer would be understood to display intelligence when a
person could not distinguish whether he or she was communicating with
a human or the computer. Since then, the definition has become much
broader and is used more generally to describe situations in which a com-
puter is not given a specific set of rules to follow in order to determine an
outcome.
“Machine learning,” as a term, is generally viewed as a subfield of AI;
we define it as the areas of mathematics, statistics, and computer science
that are used to iteratively acquire knowledge and make better predictions
of whatever task the computer is assigned to solve.9
Regardless of whether one is referring to AI or ML, the method through
which a machine learns is a four-step process. First, the model builder
assigns a task to the computer; second, the model builder provides the
method (i.e., the algorithm) the computer should use to solve the task;
third, he or she provides the measure of how the computer should evaluate
its performance; fourth, the computer gets better at solving the problem
through experience.
As an example, suppose that we tell the computer to attempt to deter-
mine who is likely to default on a loan, and we use credit scores as a
variable to explain default. Next, we tell the computer which algorithm to
use. This might be a “neural network,” a “gradient boosting machine,” or
one of many other types of algorithms. We then tell the computer to eval-
uate its performance by trying to minimize the number of people who are
estimated to be good risks, but who truly default (“false positives”).
As a first step, the computer might assign everyone the same likelihood
of default. It would then evaluate that assignment and find that it over-
estimates default for people with high credit scores while underestimating
default for people with low credit scores. With this knowledge, it then
changes its estimates of default, raising the estimates for people with low
credit scores and lowering them for people with high credit scores. The
computer continues the evaluation and improvement process until it
reaches some preset condition or cannot make its estimates more accurate.
tion to the Bureau (Sept. 14, 2017), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-
us/newsroom/cfpb-announces-first-no-action-letter-upstart-network/ [https://
perma.cc/L6MN-7A8K].
9. There is a significant amount of what we view as a somewhat pedantic
argument over the exact definitions of “machine learning” versus “artificial
intelligence,” but the definition provided above is sufficiently accepted by most
practitioners.
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III. BIG DATA AND ALTERNATIVE DATA
Like any predictive model, the development of ML models requires the
use of data. There has been a proliferation of what has been called “big
data,” generally defined as information that is large in scale and complex
in its interrelationships. ML methods are particularly adept at handling
these large and complex datasets, being able to uncover previously un-
known relationships between data elements. Importantly, however, ML
does not necessarily require large amounts of data: some of these tech-
niques can be very effective at model building with relatively small
amounts of data.
“Alternative data,” on the other hand, is not defined by its scale or
complexity, but by its novelty. Alternative data generally refers to infor-
mation used in decision-making or model building in a given context that
typically is not, or historically was not, used to inform decisions in that
context. A prime example is the use of alternative data in credit decisions.
Until recently, information including rental payments, utility payments,
occupation, social media interactions, or educational attainment were not
available or rarely, if ever, used to make credit decisions. While all five of
these factors may be predictive of a consumer’s creditworthiness, there are
reasons to think that their availability, reliability, and validity may be so
correlated with protected class status that they may ultimately be unfair,
raising discrimination concerns. What is important, however, is to recog-
nize that we do not know this at the outset: the degree of unfairness may
be dependent on the data, the people included in the dataset, or the other
variables being considered. Ultimately, whether these data do represent
unfair characteristics should be tested before they are used to make deci-
sions that would affect consumers’ lives.
Interesting examples of the value of alternative data were published in
a Federal Deposit Insurance Coporation (FDIC) working paper, On the Rise
of the FinTechs—Credit Scoring using Digital Footprints.10 They studied
whether alternative data could be predictive of default rates for a German
e-commerce company.11 Among their findings was that “the difference in
default rates between customers using iOS (Apple) and Android (for ex-
ample, Samsung) is equivalent to the difference in default rates between
[the 50th percentile of the] credit score and the 80th percentile of the credit
score.”12 They also found that customers whose email addresses contained
their names were 30% less likely to default relative to others, and that
10. Tobias Berg et al., On the Rise of the FinTechs—Credit Scoring Using Digital
Footprints (Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. Ctr. for Fin. Research, Working Paper No.
2018-04), https://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/cfr/2018/wp2018/cfr-wp
2018-04.pdf [https://perma.cc/RAZ6-VPXX].
11. Id. at 2.
12. Id. at 3.
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customers who only used lower case letters when typing their names and
addresses were more than twice as likely to default.13
If the research findings regarding device ownership hold in the United
States, and device ownership is correlated with protected class status, then
the use of device ownership in a credit model could raise concerns about
discrimination risk, particularly disparate impact. Whether it would be fair
or wise for a lender to rely on the naming conventions of email addresses
when determining who should get a loan is an additional open and im-
portant question. On the one hand, it does appear to be quite effective at
predicting default (especially when used in conjunction with other infor-
mation). However, there are many reasons why a predictive quality may
not be sufficient. To provide one example, it would be easy to “game” the
algorithm: if the applicant is more likely to get a loan by including their
name in their email address, then it would be wise for that person to take
a few minutes before applying to create a new email account. Obviously,
that person’s true likelihood of default has not changed as a result of chang-
ing their email address, but the algorithm will think that it has.14
Another question raised is that of causality, which becomes especially
acute when explaining to a consumer why he or she was refused a loan.
While we can surely guess why consumers who include their name in their
email address might be less likely to default, the words in one’s email
address do not directly or even indirectly cause default. If the relationship
between email address and default is real (i.e., not the result of spurious
correlation), then it is more likely that both share a common cause, rather
than being causally related: a person’s choice of email address is at least
partially driven by of the presence of some underlying factor which is
causally related to poor credit outcomes. For example, since most company
email addresses contain a person’s name, if a person applies for a loan
using a work email, then this indicates that he or she is employed. In that
case, the underlying factor that is driving the predictive quality of an email
address is, in fact, that the person’s email address is indicative of them
being currently employed, which diminishes default risk. If the proxy for
employment is the only factor driving email-to-default relationship in the
model then, ultimately, that means that employed customers who use per-
sonal email addresses without their names in them are being penalized
more than they would be if their employment status were more directly
measured.15
13. Id.
14. If gaming behavior were widespread and the model were refit over time,
it is likely that the gameable feature would lose predictive value. So, in practice,
the inclusion of the gaming variable in the model may be a short-lived phe-
nomenon.
15. We will note that the employment-email explanation we put forward here
is simply a hypothesis—we do not know if it is true. It would be possible to
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While name-in-email address is clearly not causally related to credit
outcomes, many traditional variables used in credit models are similarly
not directly causally related to credit outcomes. However, the common
causal relationship underlying the traditional variables and credit out-
comes tends be less tenuous than the name-in-email address example. For
example, overdrawing one’s checking account several times in a short time
period is not likely to lead directly to default on a longer-term loan, but it
is clearly indicative of the presence of financial instability that could lead
to default. While this represents a relationship that is not directly causal,
there is an obvious and intuitive connection to the underlying relationship
between overdrawn checking accounts and a lender’s justification for re-
jecting a customer. This is important when a lender provides a customer
with an explanation for rejection (i.e., an adverse action notice), so that the
customer can infer the relationship and takes steps to mitigate it. Using the
hypothetical email address-employment explanation above, a consumer is
unlikely to infer that their employment status was the underlying cause of
rejection if the reason he or she receives is, “your name was not part of
your email address.”
IV. THE POSITIVE SIDE OF AI
Putting aside questions of whether the inclusion of particular variables
would be fair or understandable, the primary value of these models and
the use of reasonable alternative data is the likely improvement in predic-
tive power relative to methods that rely on traditional data or traditional
statistical methods. More predictive models (i.e., models with the ability to
reliably predict good and bad outcomes) lead to more effective decision-
making and better overall outcomes for both the businesses that use them
and the people who are being scored with them.
Having more predictive models may lead to improved outcomes for
everyone impacted by the algorithm. In credit lending, this means that a
better model can lead not only to higher profits and less risk for the lenders
but also help the consumers who are applying for loans. Specifically, a
better ML or AI model may lead a bank to expand credit to additional
customers relative to what they would have offered under a traditional
credit model. This is because, as predictions get better, the risk of extreme
losses decreases. As a simplified example, suppose that a bank has a risk
policy such that it cannot tolerate more than a 1% chance of $10 million in
losses over a year. This might mean that, using a traditional model, the
bank could loan $100 million to consumers. But if an ML model can be
found that has more precise predictions, then the bank may be able to lend
extend this list to numerous, mostly specious, possible explanations. What this
further emphasizes is the need for testing and human review when using these
types of alternative data.
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$200 million while not changing its risk appetite (that is, a 1% chance of
losing $10 million). Further, because the risk has been better quantified, it
is likely that consumers will be, on average, charged lower interest rates.
Confirmation of this pattern recently came through results released by the
CFPB of its first No Action letter to Upstart Network, Inc. When comparing
Upstart’s use of alternative data and modeling to a traditional model, the
CFPB reported that approvals under the alternative modelwere 27%higher
than they would have been under traditional scoring, and that APRs were,
on average, 16% lower.16
A further value of ML is that decisions can, in fact, be fairer as a result
of removing decision-making that relies heavily on human involvement or
discretion. This is because minimizing human involvement lowers the risk
of human error and the influences of implicit or explicit bias. While there
has rightly been concern about biased input data leading to biased predic-
tions from AI models, one possibility that has not been extensively dis-
cussed or studied is that AI automation has the potential to ameliorate
these concerns. This is because a well-built model that evaluates objective
criteria will make its decisions about which variables are important based
solely on the predictive quality of those variables. For instance, if a bank
were to build an AI model based on historical decisions by loan officers,
some of whom are biased, then the model will likely perpetuate this bias
when it is first implemented. But over time, as the model reevaluates its
predictions in light of true (and assumedly less biased) default outcomes,
the model is likely to realize the loan officers’ bias was not predictive of
true behavior, and it will eventually minimize or remove the initial bias.
V. WHAT DOES IT MEAN FOR AN ALGORITHM TO BE FAIR?
Despite the potential to minimize bias as discussed above, ML algorithms
and the data on which they rely are not inherently bias-free. A dataset used
to train an ML algorithm may, itself, reflect outcomes of a biased decision-
making process (human or otherwise), and a well-intentionedmodel builder
may create an algorithm that perpetuates the existing bias found in the
data used to train the algorithm. Imprecise or poorly-built algorithms may
also pick up spurious correlations in data that inadvertently lead to rela-
tively worse outcomes for different demographic groups. Further, if pro-
tected groups are substantially underrepresented in the model’s develop-
ment data, and they have sufficiently different characteristics than the
predominant group, then the protected class may experience biased out-
comes. In consumer lending, if the disfavored demographic groups are
16. Patrice Ficklin & Paul Watkins, An Update on Credit Access and the Bureau’s
First No-Action Letter, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau (Aug. 6, 2019) https://
www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/blog/update-credit-access-and-no-
action-letter/ [https://perma.cc/TB8M-Q9KD].
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protected under the ECOA, the algorithm may be legally viewed as dis-
criminatory.17
While the impact of human bias can be minimized, in many situations
it likely cannot be completely eliminated: when building a model, a pro-
grammer must make decisions about which algorithms to deploy, supply
instructions for the algorithms to follow, identify the data for training, and
ultimately build a final predictive model. If there is bias in any of those
steps (even unintentional), then that bias is likely to propagate through to
the model’s predictions.
A further complication in addressing fairness is defining what consti-
tutes a “fair” decision. Academic work has shown that it is a far subtler
issue than one would expect. For example, recent research identified
twenty-one different definitions of fairness; most, if not all, of which have
some intuitive appeal.18 The research highlighted that these definitions are
not internally consistent: to achieve one measure of fairness requires a
trade-off where the quality of another measure of fairness deteriorates.19
Recognizing that competing definitions of fairness cannot be concurrently
satisfied, the choice of which definition to use often hinges on the context
or domain in which fairness is being evaluated. This is, of course, likely to
be influenced by statutory or regulatory requirements.
Recent work by Kleinberg, et al. demonstrates the likely inconsistency
between conventional measures of fairness.20 The authors consider a model
that scores risk and assigns individuals to negative and positive classes
(e.g., good and bad outcomes) based on observed characteristics.21 Individ-
uals are in one of two groups, and group membership is not a characteristic
included in the predictive model.22 Three types of fairness are considered:
17. The ECOA makes it unlawful to engage in three types of discrimination:
overt, disparate treatment, and disparate impact. Overt discrimination is bla-
tant discrimination on a prohibited basis (including, but not limited to, race,
ethnicity, sex, or age). Disparate treatment occurs when applicants are treated
differently as a result of class membership. Disparate impact occurs when a
facially neutral policy or practice has a disproportionate impact on a protected
class, unless the practice meets a legitimate business need that cannot reason-
ably be achieved as well by less discriminatory alternatives. Disparate treat-
ment, where a lender considers or includes prohibited basis characteristics in
extending or denying credit, is illegal. However, disparate impact, where there
are correlations between variables in a model and the excluded prohibited basis
characteristics, may be legal.
18. Arvind Narayanan, Translation Tutorial: 21 Fairness Definitions and Their Poli-
tics, Ass’n for Computing mach. (Feb. 23, 2018), https://fatconference.org/
2018/livestream_vh220.html.
19. Id.
20. Jon Kleinberg et al., Inherent Trade-Offs in the Fair Determination of Risk
Scores, in Innovations in Theoretical Comput. Sci. Conference (2017),
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1609.05807v1.pdf [https://perma.cc/H9NJ-ZMEA].
21. Id. at 1.
22. Id. at 3.
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calibration within groups; balance for the negative class; and balance for
the positive class.23
“Calibration” within groups requires that, for a given level of assessed
risk, the average probabilities of classification are equal across the two
groups.24 For example, among people where the model has estimated a
20% chance of default, we see that both 20% of men and 20% of women
truly do default. On the other hand, the model would not achieve calibra-
tion fairness if, among those estimated to have a 20% chance of default, we
see that women only default 15% of the time, while men default 25% of
the time.
“Balance for the negative class” requires that individuals who are as-
signed to the negative class (those who do not default) must have average
risk scores that are equal across groups.25 To be fair in terms of negative
balance, average credit scores for individuals predicted not to default must
be equal across both the protected and control groups. So, for people who
receive a loan (because they are predicted to be less likely to default), the
model would have to score both men and women with the same average
(perhaps, a 5% average) chance of default.
“Balance for the positive class” is a similar concept to “balance for the
negative class.” But the requirement here is that there must be equivalent
average scores for individuals assigned to the positive class (those who do
default).26 This means that, among the people who are rejected for a loan
because they have a high expected likelihood of defaulting, both men and
women must have the same average scores. For example, a model that
would not show balance for the positive class is one in which Hispanics
who have been rejected are predicted to have a 25% chance of default, but
rejected non-Hispanic whites have a 35% chance of default.
Kleinberg et al. demonstrate that satisfying all three definitions of fair-
ness can happen in only two cases, which are both highly unlikely in the
real world.27 The first case, defined as “perfect prediction,” is when a set
of observed values for characteristics used in the model are always associ-
ated with classification into the negative or positive class.28 In practice, it
is highly unlikely that an observed set of characteristics will always be
23. Id.
24. Id. at 4.
25. A note on terminology: From the perspective of a consumer, not getting a
loan or defaulting on it is, of course, a negative outcome. However, when we
discuss modeling default, we are estimating the chance that the person does
default. Thus, “does default” is referred to as the positive outcome, and “does
not default” is described as the negative outcome.
26. Jon Kleinberg et al., Inherent Trade-Offs in the Fair Determination of Risk
Scores, in Innovations in Theoretical Comput. Sci. Conference 4 (2017),
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1609.05807v1.pdf [https://perma.cc/H9NJ-ZMEA].
27. Id. at 5.
28. Id.
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associated with a given outcome. For instance, for a credit scoring model
that relies solely on whether an individual has high or low-income, perfect
prediction would require all high-income individuals to be in the same
class (e.g., not default) and all low-income individuals to be in the same
class (e.g., default).29 In the real world, however, some high-income indi-
viduals do default and some low-income individuals do not. The second
possible way that all three definitions can be met requires that the two
groups have “equal base rates,” which are defined as each group’s true
average probability of classification.30 In our credit scoring example, equiv-
alence of base rates would require that both the class and control groups
have the same average default rate.31
In most applications that rely on socioeconomic data, the underlying
base rates of outcomes of interest are likely to differ on the basis of sub-
groups—such as race, ethnicity, and sex—which means that the three fair-
ness measures above will almost never be concurrently satisfied.32 Further,
Kleinberg et al. demonstrate that a fourth popular measure of fairness—
statistical parity—is inconsistent with the calibration and balance fairness
conditions when base rates differ across groups.33 “Statistical parity” re-
quires outcomes for the populations of subgroups to be equivalent, which
is often a goal in domains where anti-discrimination laws are relevant.34 In
the context of credit-decisioning, evaluations of fairness tend to focus on
statistical parity.35
VI. WHAT CAN BE DONE TO MAKE AI FAIRER
Despite the complexities and nuances that give rise to bias and unfair-
ness in the use of AI models and the multiplicity of fairness goals that are
being debated amongst academics and practitioners, in our work we have
seen that it is possible to make AI models fairer. The focus of this approach
is to take a “baseline model” that has been built without consideration of
protected class status, but which shows disparate impact, and then search
for alternative models that are less discriminatory than that baselinemodel,
yet similarly predictive. While our approach is closely tied to the legal
fairness standards that apply to credit, employment, and insurance pro-
visioning, we believe that this general framework is portable to other set-
tings, regardless of whether fairness is a legal requirement or simply a
development objective. Below, we focus specifically on the framework that
we use in the context of credit models.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. Id. at 3.
34. See id.
35. For example, the extent to which application denial rates are equal across
groups that are protected by the ECOA.
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Our general approach focuses on evaluating model outcomes for dis-
parate impact discrimination risk. The approach mirrors the legal burden-
shifting test that originated in employment law and has become the rele-
vant legal test for disparate impact discrimination.36 Under the test: (1)
plaintiff identifies an adverse impact on a protected class, (2) defendant
(creditor) has the opportunity to identify a legitimate business need, and
(3) plaintiff proposes a less discriminatory alternative (that reasonably
achieves the same business objective). In our review, there is no distinction
between the role of plaintiff and defendant. The burden-shifting test serves
as a guide, and models are evaluated from the perspective of all three
prongs.
The review typically starts after a model has been developed but before
it has been deployed. In the context of credit and employment (and, to
some extent, insurance), protected class characteristics such as race, eth-
nicity, and sex are explicitly excluded from the model building, during the
development process, but are made available to us when conducting an
assessment of disparate impact. Outcomes of the models are reviewed and
if there are material differences in outcomes on the basis of protected class,
we turn to consideration of legitimate business need. In banking, themodel
governance function is generally quite robust, so the question of whether
the model has a valid business justification, (i.e., does it have the ability to
predict default at some minimum level of accuracy and precision), has
already been established. Consequently, the legitimate business need re-
quirement is nearly always met. However, while the overall model may be
sufficiently predictive to be considered to have a valid business justifica-
tion, it is essential to review the individual variables that go into the model
to ensure that they are reasonable.
Assuming that all of the variables used in the model have valid business
justifications, the review then focuses on finding alternative models that
are less discriminatory but similarly predictive.37 This is where AI is likely
to be better than traditional statistical modeling. Because AI models are
more complex, a modeler has more ways to change or tweak the model in
order to attempt to make the model less discriminatory. Further, because
new methods have been developed to deal with discrimination in AI, we
can address these questions head-on and find less discriminatory alterna-
tives that preserve a baseline model’s predictive power.
In traditional statistical models, the only option for finding less discrim-
inatory models is to add or drop variables that go into the model. For
instance, suppose that we find that a given credit score is the primarydriver
36. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 439 (1971) (rejecting employer’s
use of intelligence tests and an education requirement as a prerequisite to em-
ployment due to the employer’s failure to satisfy the burden of proving that
the test demonstrated a reasonable measure of job performance).
37. If a lender were to find that a variable does not have sufficient business
justification to warrant its inclusion, then it would be removed from the model.
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of disparate impact in the model. In our alternatives analysis we would
search for other variables, perhaps including a different type of credit score,
that results in the model having a lower disparate impact. In that case,
before using the model to make actual credit decisions, the bank would
remove the more discriminatory credit score and replace it with the less
discriminatory variable we found.
But in AI, we are not limited just to adding or removing variables. In-
stead, there are many different approaches that we can try in order to find
a less discriminatory alternative model. In addition to adding or dropping
variables, there are methods that can keep the variable in the model but
diminish the influence of its correlation with protected class status. As an
example of one technique, each machine learning algorithm has what are
called “hyperparameters,” which are settings that tell the algorithm how
to learn from the data. Changing these settings within an appropriate range
can slightly change the predictions given by the algorithm. We have found
that in many (but not all) cases it is possible to alter these in order to get a
less discriminatory model. Hyperparameters are generally not part of tra-
ditional statistical methods, thus the option to change these to minimize
bias is a benefit unique to using AI.
Other techniques can also be employed to minimize discrimination.One
such method is to use what is known as “adversarial de-biasing,” where
two models work together to find the optimal outcome. Here, the first
model predicts whatever outcome is being measured (e.g., default rates),
while the second model uses those predictions to estimate the race, gender,
or age of each customer.38 The models then work together to maximize the
quality of the predictions from the first model while minimizing the second
model’s ability to predict protected class status.39 This has the effect of
diminishing the influence of variables that are strongly correlated with
protected class status.40
An additional technique that is similar in effect to the adversarial ap-
proach is known as “regularization.” In this context, a regularized model
38. Brian Hu Zhang et al., Mitigating Unwanted Biases With Adversarial
Learning, in Artificial Intelligence, Ethics, and Society Conference
(2018), http://www.aies-conference.com/wp-content/papers/main/AIES_2018
_paper_162.pdf [https://perma.cc/P4AV-RCPE]. For a relatively non-technical
explanation of the approach, along with an example of how well it works, see
Hank Griffioen, Fairness in Machine Learning with Pytorch, GoDataDriven (May
22, 2019), https://blog.godatadriven.com/fairness-in-pytorch [https://perma
.cc/V8W6-E9L3].
39. Brian Hu Zhang et al., Mitigating Unwanted Biases With Adversarial
Learning, in Artificial Intelligence, Ethics, and Society (2018), http://
www.aies-conference.com/wp-content/papers/main/AIES _ 2018 _ paper _
162.pdf [https://perma.cc/P4AV-RCPE].
40. See id. (equating this as playing a zero-sum game to diminish any unduly
negative effects).
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works by balancing the predictiveness of the model and its relationship to
disparate impact. As the model learns, it calculates a trade-off in the pre-
dictiveness gained relative to any increase in disparate impact. If the gain
in prediction is not sufficient to overcome an increase in disparate impact,
then the model will attempt to find a different path towards a predictive
but less discriminatory solution.
As an example of how a regularized model works, suppose that the
model being used is based on decision trees, where people either receive
loans or are rejected as a result of various cutoffs chosen by the algorithm.
In other words, if the model uses credit scores to determine who is likely
to default, it will try various cutoffs of scores to see what is most predictive
of default. Suppose the algorithm tries two cuts of the data: one credit score
equals 600 and one credit score equals 700. When it tries the cutoff at 600,
it finds that it correctly identifies 75% of defaulters and non-defaulters.
However, it also finds that the adverse impact ratio (a common measure
of disparate impact, where a value of 1.0 means that protected classes and
control classes receive favorable outcomes at equal rates) is equal to 0.65.
It then tries the cutoff at 700 and finds that it correctly identifies 73% of
defaulters and non-defaulters (a decrease in accuracy of 3%). However, the
adverse impact ratio has increased to 0.79. This represents a substantial
improvement in disparate impact, while only minimally affecting the pre-
dictive power of the model, likely making the tradeoff worthwhile.
Finally, there is still the option of adding or removing variables, which
can be made more efficient through “explainable AI,” which overcomes the
black-box nature of AI models, and helps to identify the importance and
influence of model inputs on model predictions. These methods can be
used to determine what may be causing bias in a model, and then attention
can be focused on removing the biased effect of those variables. One of the
chief advantages of these methodologies is that they can be automated and
the results can be provided as part of the standard model review and docu-
mentation process.
VII. CONCLUSION
The advent of the use of AI, ML, alternative data, and big data for
decision-making holds promise but also poses risks. The scrutiny of ad-
vances in these areas has generated skepticism: will this information and
these methods truly benefit individuals, or will the risk inherent in their
use overshadow their value? In certain contexts, some of the benefits and
risks are clear. Where there are risks, these risks can often be evaluated,
managed, and mitigated.
In credit decision-making, AI, ML, and newly available data may be
used to extend credit to consumers who are otherwise underserved by
traditional credit decision-making methods, and to offer credit on better
terms to consumers who already have access to credit. However, these new
algorithmic models that rely on automated decision-making are not inher-
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ently bias free. While they do minimize human subjectivity, bias can arise
in the model development process. Further, model developers can make
decisions that introduce bias, and the data used to develop models may be
inherently biased itself.
Recognizing the existence and nature of algorithmic bias, as well as the
risks associated with reliance on newly available data, is a necessary step
to designing and implementing approaches to ensure that these algorithmic
decision-making processes are as fair as possible. Unlawful bias arising
from the use of algorithms can be evaluated and mitigated, but doing so
requires a deep understanding of these new methods, data, and the con-
texts and domains in which they are being used.

